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Abstract: The sheepskin effect is a wage increase connected to the attainment of a 
degree (or credential) in addition to the wage gap connected to the completion of a 
schooling level (school years, exams passed etc.). This effect is often referred to as a 
phenomenon supporting the signaling (or screening) hypothesis against human capital 
theory in the so called ‘signaling vs. human capital debate’ over the economic role of 
education. Many empirical studies in many countries have tested (mostly successfully) 
this hypothesis during the last decades, but it has never been tested in Hungary. 
Therefore the main goal of the current study is to identify and measure the sheepskin 
effect in Hungarian higher education based on the country-wide, representative 
databases of the Hungarian Graduate Career Tracking System (HGCTS). The 2 
databases used in the analysis are two HGCTS surveys from the years 2011 and 2012. 
The first part of the article is a literature review that summarises the results of the existing 
empirical sheepskin research and highlights their connections to the signaling vs. human 
capital debate. In the second part, empirical research is carried out based on the HGCTS 
data. This research has two phases. In the first phase subjective data are analysed 
(according to the perceived negative effect of not obtaining the degree in time), while in 
the second, mean differences are tested between net hourly wages of responder groups 
(1) who have the educational credential and (2) do not have it (even though they have 
finished all courses and passed all exams at the given educational level). The statistical 
analysis identified significant wage gaps between graduated responders and those who 
had not graduated but had passed the state exam (and so had finished all the exams in 
higher education before graduating) on nearly all levels and in both samples (the only 
exemption was the post-Bologna master level in the 2011 sample). We can conclude that 
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The aim of the current study is to identify and measure the sheepskin effect in Hungarian 
higher education based on the country-wide, representative databases of the Hungarian 
Graduate Career Tracking System (HGCTS). The two databases used in the analysis 
are ‘Frissdiplomások2011’, and ‘Frissdiplomások2012’.  
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The expression ‘the sheepskin effect’ originates from the tradition that in many parts of 
the world, degree certificates were formerly written on lamb skin (Brown and Sessions, 
2004: 96). According to the sheepskin effect hypothesis those who complete all courses 
in a school or university but do not graduate earn less on the labour market than those 
who earned the degree. Many empirical studies in many countries have tested this 
hypothesis, such as those by Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974), Groot and Oostrebeek 
(1994), Jeager and Page (1996), Crespo and Cortez (2005), van der Meer (2011), and 
Mora and Muro (2014). The launch of the HGCTS in 2010 established the opportunity to 
implement such a test in Hungary, too, but only within certain limits (questionnaire items, 
sample size). Although analysing specific sectors or geographical areas can also be 
interesting, this paper will analyse the available data only on a general level, focusing on 
the total population in order to provide a starting point for later studies.  
In the second section the definitions of the sheepskin effect will be summarised as well 
as the basic underlying theories. The third section describes the sample and method of 
the empirical research, while the fourth presents the results. Conclusions, the limits of 
the findings and possible future research areas are dealt with in the last chapter. 
 
2. Literature review 
An operational definition of the sheepskin effect depends on the available data and 
methodology. According to what is probably the most commonly used definition, the 
sheepskin effect is the wage gap between credentialed and non-credentialed employees 
conditional on their years of schooling (see Belman and Heywood, 1997, among others). 
Unfortunately, the data required by this definition are sometimes not available. For those 
cases another definition - used by Hartog (1983) - is more adequate. In his work the 
sheepskin effect was the wage gap between those who obtained their diploma and those 
who attended the same level of education but did not obtain the credential. We can 
summarise these two descriptions of the examined phenomenon as follows: the 
sheepskin effect is a wage increase connected to the attainment of a degree (credential) 
above the wage gap connected to the completion of a schooling level (school years, 
exams passed etc.) without a credential. 
The sheepskin effect as defined above is frequently referred to as a phenomenon 
supporting the signaling (or screening) hypothesis against human capital theory in the so 
called ‘signaling vs. human capital debate’ over the economic role of education. 
Regarding this debate, see among others Brown and Sessions (2004) or Kun (2013). 
Here we focus only on the role of the sheepskin effect in this debate.  
Among others, Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974), Hungerford and Solon (1987), Hartog 
(1983), Groot and Oostrebeek (1994) and Park (1999) have used the sheepskin effect 
as a baseline to conduct their signaling vs. human capital research. Unfortunately, this 
goes against the common versions of both human capital and signaling/screening 
theories, and could only differentiate particular models. Differences in productivity can be 
shown when earning a degree, since one has to pass the final exam, write a thesis or 
face other challenges.  
The assumption that having motivation, perseverance and “character” are non-
observable, productivity-determining factors indicated by the presence of credentials has 
been confirmed by an investigation conducted by Arkes (1999).  
Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) approached this problem from another angle, 
considering the human capital hypothesis. Their starting point was that if education is a 
signal, the earned credential has significantly higher independent value (compared to 
school years), than when it is used only for increasing human capital. Thus it can be 
concluded that when credentials are attained the number of school years may increase 
wages more quickly than when credentials are not attained. Applying meta-analysis to 
several empirical studies it has been established that if one does not have any credential, 
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the return on school years is not significantly less than for those having credentials, which 
means the signaling/screening hypothesis can be discarded.  However, this experience 
re-occurs in most of the models built on the informational role of education. See, e.g., the 
study by Riley (1976), where every educational level has the same return. They also 
argued that the results of Taubman and Wales (1973) – namely that the effect of education 
on wages decreases over age – supports human capital theory, since its probable 
explanation is that employers’ knowledge of the real productivity of the employee 
increases, since the employers do not rely on credentials that much. Layard and 
Psacharopoulos also considered the non-existence of cheaper alternative screening 
methods as a reason for not signaling. According to them, if education was solely 
screening, companies would have already developed their own screening/testing 
methods. This latter argument is very weak, as Wiles (1974) and Stiglitz (1975) both 
pointed out; ensuring screening possibilities for companies is the external effect of 
education.  Furthermore screening works very well here. In this way, it will always be 
relatively cheaper to use education as a screening device compared to the quality of 
information. 
The uniqueness of the research by Groot and Oostrebeek (1994) on Dutch data derives 
from the fact that school years are analysed in more detail here than in the previous 
studies. They define effective (school) years, repeated years, skipped years, inefficient 
years and dropout years. The effect of repeated years is negative without screening and 
neutral in the case of human capital. The effect of dropout years ending without a degree 
is neutral assuming signaling, while positive in the case of human capital models. 
Skipped years have a positive effect in the screening model, although they have no effect 
in the human capital model. Inefficient years (when one reaches a given credential later 
or with more school types, than the others) have no effect in the case of screening, while 
in the case of human capital they have, assuming homogeneous resources, otherwise 
they do not. This categorization has been used to examine two predictions of 
signaling/screening. According to the first prediction, finishing school earlier indicates 
better abilities, while the other prediction is the sheepskin hypothesis, which means not 
having the credential makes school years worthless. Eventually, the screening 
hypothesis is discarded and the human capital hypothesis supported. 
It is not only Arkes (1999), who assumes that both human capital and screening theories 
can be applied to explain the sheepskin effect. Frazis (2002), for instance, developed 
both of the models to a certain extent, making them appropriate tools to explain the 
phenomenon. Two abilities were inserted into the human capital model: constant inner 
productivity and the ability to acquire human capital. Similar models were applied in Willis 
and Rosen (1979), Garen (1984) and Frazis (1993). In the meantime, one additional 
factor has been inserted to the screening theory, too: the uncertainty of the employees 
concerning their own capabilities. 
Crespo and Cortez (2005) have performed a really interesting analysis related to the 
sheepskin effect. They studied how intense was the effect between 1982 and 2002 in 
Brazil. According to their results, on the lowest school level the effect disappeared and, 
apart from the highest level, it decreased significantly on the other levels, as well. 
However, on the highest level it is still remarkable, although also reduced. the authors 
explain this by the higher demand from companies for higher educational degrees along 
with economic development – due to the new technology.  
Jaeger and Page (1996) pointed out the different extent of the sheepskin effect (in every 
qualification higher than a high school certificate) measured by sex and minority, on “high 
school” and “college” levels. In different demographical groups the effect of various levels 
was also discrepant. Bitzan (2009) raised a similar question: the sheepskin effect shown 
in white and in black communities was assessed and compared in the USA labour 
market. A significant effect appeared in both of the groups, but while among white people 
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it was stronger on lower levels (college or lower); among black people the effect was the 
reverse, being stronger on higher levels (graduate degree). It is very similar to the 
phenomenon Ferrer and Riddell (2008) experienced between Canadian immigrants and 
non-immigrants. There, the effect of school years and experience was negligible in the 
case of immigrants, while the credentials earnt there provided much more benefit, 
compared to those of non-immigrants. 
Gulasson (1999) has analysed the results of an American follow-up study that provided 
data of the same group 6 times between 1972 and 1986. It was found that the sheepskin 
effect did not appear when an individual worked in a job suitable for his/her credential, 
but did appear if this was not the case. Probably one of the most exciting research studies 
in this field is the one by Liu et al. (2013) that concluded there were beneficial health 
effects from earning a credential (given diseases appear with a lower probability). This 
supports the assumption that the earned credential is important not only because of the 
knowledge one can acquire in school, but also because it is able to predict other abilities 
e.g. health. Other interesting research papers examining the sheepskin effect include 
(among others): McGuinness (2002), Van der Meer (2011), Denny and Harmon (2001), 
Silles (2008), El-Hamidi (2006), and Gibson (2000). 
 
 
3. Sample and method 
This article uses two databases of the HGCTS from 2011 and 2012 (‘Frissdiplomások 
2011’ and ‘Frissdiplomások2012’). These data are the output of national graduate career 
tracking surveys regarding Hungarian higher education. Responding was voluntary, thus 
self-selection bias must be taken into consideration. The database from the 2011 survey 
contains responders who finished their higher education studies (with graduation or with 
a state exam only) in 2008 or 2010, while in the 2012 survey the responders’ year of 
graduation or state exam was 2007, 2009 or 2011. The total number of responders was 
20,453 in Frissdiplomások2011 (8,943 finished in 2008, 10,533 in 2010, and there was 
no finishing time data for 976 responders) and 24,890 in Frissdiplomások2012 (2007: 
5,184, 2009: 8,333, 2011: 9,500, no data: 1,873). Both surveys contained multiple 
questionnaire items useful to measure the sheepskin effect: current earnings (in 2011 or 
in 2012, respectively), the level and area of education, whether the responder obtained 
the credential or only had a state exam, how long did it take to obtain the credential after 
the state exam (if it was not immediate), whether the responder felt any disadvantage in 
not having the credential (if he/she did not have it immediately). Unfortunately, the level 
and area of education data were far from complete, since these were only collected 
regarding one of the responder’s degrees (HGCTS data collection is organised through 
higher education institutions and is unaware of multiple graduations). 
The particular research definition of the sheepskin effect was adjusted to the possibilities 
of the databases used, and this also defined the limits of the methodology: it is the wage 
difference between those obtaining their credential and those who passed their state 
exam (the very last exam in Hungary before graduating) but who did not graduate (for 





This section will first summarise the subjective data (the perceived effect of the 
credential), then the more objective data of net earnings will be compared between those 




4.1. Subjective data 
In this subsection ratios of the subjective data will be summarised regarding the 
perceived handicap caused by not obtaining the credential in time (right after the state 
exam has been passed). Responders had to select from 3 options: if they experienced 
no disadvantage, minor disadvantage or major disadvantage. Table 1 summarises the 
answers, from which we can conclude the following: in every year and on every level not 
having the credential led to a perceived minor or major disadvantage in more than 50% 
of the valid cases.  
 
Table 1: Perceived disadvantage from not obtaining the credential (people; valid%) 
 Educational level and year of the survey 
 BA/BSc MA/MSc college university 
Answer option 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 


































































Not responding 1404  135 181  17 935 47 1128 205 
Source: calculated from ‘Frissdiplomások2011’ and ‘Frissdiplomások2012’ databases 
Note: college = pre-Bologna college level (3-4 years); university = pre-Bologna university 
level (5+ years) 
 
4.1. The credential wage gap 
Table 2 shows net hourly wage data (mean, standard deviation, values of two sample t-
test statistics) in HUF from the 2011 survey per educational level and per having or not 
having a degree. Table 3 contains similar data but from the 2012 survey. In both tables 
the significance of the mean difference was tested with two independent samples t-
statistics.  
 
Table 2: Hourly wage gap between credentialed and non-credentialed employees (2011) 
(HUF) 
Education level Degree N Mean Standard 
deviation 
t-test 
BA/BSc No 542 0.8965 0.81768 -1.8887* 
Yes 1872 0.9610 0.66146 
Pre-Bologna college No 482 0.8907 0.70194 -2.5042** 
Yes 2757 1.0054 0.96283 
Pre-Bologna or undivided 
university 
No 351 1.0118 0.66912 -4.1184*** 
Yes 3191 1.1732 0.91425 
MSc No 92 1.0129 0.65569 -1.4081 
Yes 691 1.1336 0.78706 
Source: calculated from database Frissdiplomások2011  
Note: N is the number of cases; *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10 
 
The reader can recognise that on every educational level the degree always leads to a 
higher mean net hourly wage, although this is significant only on the BA/BSc, pre-
Bologna college and pre-Bologna or undivided university levels. 
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Table 3: Hourly wage gap between credentialed and non-credentialed employees (2012) 
(HUF) 
Education level Degree N Mean Standard 
deviation 
t-test 
BA/BSc No 643 0.8222 0.52281 -6.7901*** 
Yes 2951 0.9867 0.68965 
Pre-Bologna college No 602 0.9333 0.67808 -4.9919*** 
Yes 3846 1.0867 0.70487 
Pre-Bologna or 
undivided university 
No 319 1.0466 0.74284 -4.8409*** 
Yes 4037 1.2612 0.97727 
MSc No 102 0.8842 0.36669 -5.8487*** 
Yes 961 1.1416 0.76829 
Source: calculated from database Frissdiplomások2012 
Note: N is the number of cases; *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10 
 
Data from the 2012 survey (just like the one conducted in 2011) revealed a positive 
contribution of credentials to the net hourly wage, but this time these wage gaps are 




The current study examined the existence of the sheepskin effect in Hungarian higher 
education. In the first part of the article the phenomenon was defined (an adjusted 
definition was selected to fit the available database), then the place of the sheepskin 
effect in the signaling vs. human capital debate was briefly described with a literature 
review (focusing on the empirical works). In the second part two broad-brush 
examinations of the Hungarian credential wage gap were implemented 1) using a 
subjective measure of the responders’ perceptions and 2) performing independent 
sample t-tests. Both were implemented on the Hungarian Graduate Career Tracking 
Survey databases from 2011 and 2012. The subjective data showed that more than half 
of those responders who did not have the credential felt a minor or major disadvantage 
in every year and on every educational level. The t-tests identified significant wage gaps 
between graduate responders and those ones who were non-graduate but had passed 
the state exam (and so had finished all the exams in higher education before graduating) 
on nearly all levels in both samples (the only exception was the post-Bologna master 
level in the 2011 sample). Based on this, we can conclude that the existence of the 
sheepskin effect in the Hungarian labour market is confirmed. Nevertheless, it is still 
unclear how the above mentioned phenomenon is distributed among different sectors of 
the labour and/or higher education market. Subsequent research should also identify the 
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